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The inherent safety indices are the widely accepted tool to assess the inherent safety 
level at the preliminary design stage. Numerous inherent safety indices have been 
designed to assess the failure potential of shell and tube heat exchanger but limited 
indices have a capability to measure the failure potential of the heat exchanger 
network at the preliminary design stage. Moreover, integration between process 
design stages with risk and consequence estimation is extremely important in order 
to design inherently safe process plants. However, the lack of formal integration 
between process design stages with risk and consequence estimation results in 
unproductive estimation of risk levels and consequence that occurs during a 
particular process route until the design is completed. Few studies on the integration 
of risk estimation with process design are available but a viable framework is yet to 
be reported. Hence, based on the highlighted issue, application of integrated Risk 
Estimation Tool (iRET) for explosion scenarios is proposed to study the failure 
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1.1 Background of Study 
 
Shell and tube heat exchanger is an equipment which is utilized widely in chemical 
process and manufacturing industry, power generation, waste heat recoveries, 
refrigeration, air-conditioning and space applications. It can be used in the industry 
as a cooler, radiator, evaporator, condenser and boiler. Shell and tube heat exchanger 
can be utilized under two important conditions which are high temperature range and 
high flow rates. These conditions differentiate a shell and tube heat exchanger with 
the rest of the exchangers available. However, this heat exchanger experiences a high 
failure rate compared to other process equipment as it is used for variety of 
applications.  
 
FIGURE 1     Shell and Tube Heat Exchanger 
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 It is observed that shell and tube heat exchanger fails very frequently in chemical 
process industry whereby this specific equipment is led towards failure without 
accomplishing its useful life. Various shell and tube heat exchanger failure incidents 
have been reported as listed in appendix-A and the frequent breakdown of this heat 
exchanger has caused heavy production loss to the industry. The latest incident took 
place on the 2nd April, 2010 at Tesoro Anacortes refinery United States. 
Catastrophic rupture of shell and tube heat exchanger was observed by high 
temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA).  
 
The failure analysis of various process equipments has been done by few researchers 
whereby the recent analysis is performed by (Kamarizan, K., & Markku, H., 2013). 
(Kamarizan, K., & Markku, H., 2013) used failure knowledge database (FKD) 
system which has been developed in Japan to compare the data obtained to the 
previously available failure data. The comparison is as follows: 
 
TABLE 1     Type of Equipment Causing the Most Accidents (Kamarizan, K., & 
Markku, H., 2013) 
Equipment 
Type 














25 33 16 14 33 24 
Reactors 14 9 14 5 10 10 
Storage 
Tanks 
14 20 2 14 17 13 
Pressure 
Vessels 






8 11 6 19 4 10 
Separations 
Equipment 
7 - - 5 3 5 
Other 
Equipment 
22 8 44 40 28 30 
 
From Table 1, it can be seen that the piping system has the largest failure percentage 
compared to the rest of the process equipment. In order to rank the inherent safety 
level of process stream at preliminary design stage, (Azmi, M. S., Chan, T. L., & 
Dzulkarnain, Z., 2012) have developed a process stream index (PSI). Besides that, 
storage tank is the second highest failure equipment. However, (Kamarizan, K., & 
Markku, H., 2013) has highlighted that the failure of storage tank is mostly resulted 
from human and organizational errors. Hence, it is difficult to predict the failure 
assessment of storage tank by process integration design. (Heikkila, A.M., 1999) 
considers storage tanks as offsite battery limit (OSBL) equipment which means 
storage tank are not the part of an integrated design process, so it is difficult to 
implement process integration methods for the inherently safer design of storage 
tanks. 
 
Chemical reactors and heat transfer equipment are the next process equipments with 
the highest failure. (Duguid, I. M., 2001) has ranked heat transfer equipment above 
chemical reactors due to their scope of work in hydrocarbon industry. On the other 
hand, Kamarizan, K., & Markku, H. (2013) classified chemical reactor above heat 
transfer equipment due to the work scope which covered chemical process industry. 
Both of these equipments are part of process design and integration.  
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 Currently, there are limited inherent safety indices available in order to assess 
inherent safety level of shell and tube heat exchanger. Two examples of inherent 
safety indices are safety weighted hazardous index (SWeHI) and integrated inherent 
safety index (I2SI). These indices are able to measure the inherent safety level of 
shell and tube heat exchanger equipment at the later design stages whereby 
inherently safer design (ISD) principles are difficult to be implemented.  
 
Key Performance Indicator (KPI) developed by (Alessandro, T., & Valerio, C., 2007) 
used consequence based approach to analyse failure assessment of shell and tube 
heat exchanger. However, this methodology only engulfs the single shell and tube 
heat exchanger. This index has a limited access to assess the failure potential of heat 
exchanger network. Secondly, this methodology doesn’t provide any solution 
regarding the prioritization of heat exchanger in the given heat exchanger network. 
 
The latest concern in the industry is that most of the current safety indices have 
inadequacy to assess the failure potential for the single and multiple shell and tube 
heat exchangers at the preliminary design stage. A user friendly methodology is 
required to assess the inherent safety level of shell and tube heat exchanger at the 
preliminary design stage.  Hence, this project proposes the consequence based study 
of heat exchanger network by application of integrated Risk Estimation Tool (iRET). 
This tool has been developed by (Azmi, M. S., et al, 2006) and is based on the TNT 
equivalence and TNO correlation methods. Initially, the implementation of this tool 
was considered for failure potential assessment of piping system only and for design 
and layout modification. Currently, the implementation of iRET considers the failure 






 1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Various techniques and methods such as hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP), 
quantitative risk analysis (QRA), failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) and safety 
indices are used to quantify the safety level of shell and tube heat exchanger. 
However, following shortcomings are found in order to assess the inherent safety 
level of heat exchanger network:  
 Meagre accessibility to evaluate the failure potential of heat exchanger network 
at the preliminary design stage. 
 
 Available safety analysis methodologies have limited potential to layout an 





The objectives of this project are as follows: 
 Consequence based strategy by applying iRET tool to analyse the failure 
potential of shell and tube heat exchanger (STHE). 
 
 Prioritization of heat exchanger according to their failure potential. 
 





                                                       5                                                                 
 1.4 Scope of Study 
 
The scope of this project is limited on the implementation of iRET tool for explosion 
scenarios to determine the failure potential assessment of shell and tube heat 
exchanger (STHE) and achieve a safer design at preliminary design stage. Shell and 
tube heat exchanger has been selected due to various reasons. First and foremost, it is 
an integral component of most of the equipment such as distillation column, 
absorber, and stripper and basket type chemical reactors.  
 
Secondly, it is a part of process integration design and plays a vital role in pinch 
analysis which is used for energy optimization, eventually, it has substantial failure 
history. Several case studies and failure analysis reports of heat exchanger are given 
in appendix-A. Besides that, iRET tool is developed based on TNT equivalence and 
TNO correlation methods for consequence analysis of worst case explosion 
scenarios. Probabilities of consequence impacts such as structural damage, glass 
breakage, fatalities and injury are used to prioritize the heat exchangers in the heat 












CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 An Overview of Inherently Safer Design 
 
Inherently safer design (ISD) is an alternative philosophy for addressing safety issues 
in the design and operation of chemical plants. Eliminating or essentially reducing 
hazards is the main focus of ISD. According to Centre for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS), the customary approach to deal with chemical process safety has 
acknowledged the existence and magnitude of hazards in a process. In order to 
reduce risk, efforts have been put into managing risks associated with the hazards. 
ISD has the potential to make chemical processing technology simpler and more 
economical. Besides that, it also provides strong and reliable risk management. 
  
(Hendershot, D. C., 1999) states that the main focus of ISD is on the immediate 
impacts of single events or chemical accidents on people, the environment, property 
and business. This generally means the immediate impacts of fires, explosions, and 
the release of toxic materials in a chemical manufacturing plant. However, these 
types of events will also have the potential for long-term impacts on people, the 
environment, and possibly property and business. Reducing the magnitude or 
potential likelihood of accidents will also have benefits from the perspective of the 
potential long-term impacts. Even though engineers have recognized the potential 
benefits of ISD in these other areas, the main intent of ISD is to reduce the frequency 
and potential impact of chemical plant accidents. 
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 ISD can be considered to be a subset of green chemistry and engineering. Green 
chemistry and engineering have a much broader scope which includes the following 
(Hendershot, D. C., 1999): 
 Health and environmental impacts of emissions from routine plant operations 
 Health and environmental effects of all phases of the production and use life 
cycle of a material, from the basic raw materials through the final product, 
including all by-products and wastes 
 Sustainable development and impact on non-renewable resources 
 
Safety incidents such as fires, explosions, and toxic releases have both immediate 
and long-term impacts and are clearly part of green chemistry and engineering. 
(Hendershot, D. C., 1999) further states that a “green” process is often inherently 
safer whereby it uses less toxic materials. This type of process may reduce safety 
consequences, immediate injury from exposure to released material as well as offer 
reduced long-term health and environmental hazards. However, conflicts may occur 
as well. A more efficient chemistry may reduce consumption of resources and 
produce less waste but the chemistry may be more energetic, increasing the safety 
risk of a reactive chemistry explosion. 
 
Furthermore, inherent safety strives to enhance process safety by introducing 
fundamentally safer characteristics into process design. Inherently safer plants have 
less built-in hazard potential than plants with a conventional process concept. (Kletz, 
T. A., 1991) has formalized six key principles of inherent safety which are 
intensification, substitution, attenuation, limits effect, simplification and error 






 TABLE 2     General Principles of Inherent Safety (Kletz, T. A., 1991) 
PRINCIPLES EXPLANATION 
Intensification  Reduction of the inventories of 
hazardous materials 
Substitution  Change of hazardous 
chemicals substances by less 
hazardous chemicals 
Attenuation  Reduction of the volumes of 
hazardous materials required in 
the process. 
 Reduction of operation hazards 
by changing the processing 
conditions to lower 
temperatures, pressures or 
flows. 
Limitation of Effect  The facilities must be designed 
in order to minimize effects of 
hazardous chemicals or 
energies releases 
Simplification  Avoidance of complexities 
such as multi-product or multi-
unit operations, or congested 
pipe or unit settings. 
Error Tolerance  Making equipment robust, 
processes that can bear upsets, 
reactors able to withstand 





 Implementation of ISD at early phase of research and development yields the best 
opportunities as the changes in process design are cheaper and easier to be done. 
Inherent safety is difficult to be implemented at a later stage as it is tougher to 
change the basic technology and probability. (Hurme, M., & Rahman, M., 2005) 
have highlighted that inherent safety should be implemented at early design stage. 
However, most of the information is not available at early design stage. Besides that, 
the importance of inherent safety tool is also emphasized at the preliminary design 
stage. Figure 2 illustrates the best time to apply ISD principle at research and 
development phase and preliminary design stage. 
 
 
FIGURE 2     The Design Impossibility and Inherently Safer Design (Hurme, M., & 
Rahman, M., 2005) 
 
Zwetsloot, G. I. J. M., & Askounes Ashford, N., 1999 highlighted that the “primary 
prevention” tool for chemical accidents is inherent safety. The difference between 
inherent safety from secondary accident prevention and accident mitigation 
techniques is that inherent safety can reduce the probability of occurrence of 
chemical accidents, seriousness of injuries, property as well as environmental 
damage. The protective measures often require regular preventive maintenance and 
calibration at later stage of process design which helps to enhance plant operation 
cost and keeping documentation up-to-date for auditing. 
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 Various books and research publications such as (CCPS, 2000), (Edwards, D. W., 
Lawrence, D., & Rushton, A. G., 1996), (Hendershot, D. C., 2000) and (Faisal, I. K., 
& Amyotte, P. R., 2002) concluded that inherent safety is a cost optimal approach 
when considering the lifetime cost of a process and its operation. Besides that, 
(Warwick, A.R., 1998) and (Crawley, F., & Tyler, B., 2003) have emphasized that 
largest pay offs are achieved by implementing inherent safety principles in the early 
design stage of a plant design. 
 
 
2.2 Inherent Safety Indices for Consequence Based Analysis 
The inherent safety index is a quantitative tool to measure ISD options. It is usually 
proposed to represent the process hazards that allow the identification of inherently 
safer design alternatives. Inherent safety indices are given single values that assess 
inherent safety level of the system. Numerous quantitative tools were developed for 
inherent safety assessment in process design. 
 
(Gentile, M., et al, 2003) state that inherent safety quantification methodologies can 
be classified in three groups:  
 Collection of various well-known indices used to evaluate various safety aspects 
but results cannot be aggregated as an overall index.  
 Single overall index that evaluate the aspect relevant to inherent safety and 
results aggregated as an overall index.  





 The integrated Risk Estimation Tool (iRET) was developed by (Azmi, M. S., et al, 
2006) for consequence analysis of worst case explosion scenario. (Azmi, M. S., et al, 
2006) used TNT equivalence and TNO correlation methods to develop this tool. This 
prototype tool was integrated with process design simulator through MS-Excel which 
reduces time and error. This prototype tool (iRET) can estimate flammable properties, 
flammable mass, explosion parameters and potential damage. It is applicable at 
preliminary engineering design stage and requires chemicals and theirs properties, 
simulated PFD, material balance and operating conditions data for its evaluation. 
 
Besides that, Key Performance Index (KPI) was developed by (Alessandro, T., & 
Valerio, C., 2007). Its basic objective is to evaluate potential and hazardous index by 
failure modes and consequence analysis of credible scenarios of single units and the 
whole process. A specific equipment classification and related failure modes were 
identified in order to define the potential accidental scenarios associated to each 
process unit. It can be implemented at preliminary design stage. Process flow 
diagram (PFD), material balance, operating conditions, equipment technical detail 
data and substance inventories are required to evaluate the unit potential index (UPI) 
and unit hazardous index (UHI). The summation of UPI and UHI will provide the 
potential index (PI) and hazardous index (HI) of the whole process. 
 
Furthermore, Inherent Fire Consequence Estimation Tool (IFCET) was developed by 
Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Its basic objective is to eliminate or 
minimize the consequence of fire accidents during preliminary design stage. The tool 
is developed in MS Excel for pool fire model and linked with process design 
simulator, iCON. It can be implemented at preliminary design stage. However, 
practical application of inherent safety is still limited due to non-availability of easy 






CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY OR PROJECT WORK 
 
3.1 iRET Algorithm 
 
An iRET algorithm uses an established explosion model in order to estimate 
consequences resulting from explosions. Determination of mass released in an 
accident, which is a function of hole diameter, pressure and leak duration is required 
in an explosion risk and consequence estimation. The iRET algorithm to determine 
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 (CCPS, 1992) recommends that relative ranking is an appropriate method to compare 
hazardous attributes, process conditions and operating parameters at the preliminary 
design stage. However, in this project the values of consequence impacts such as 
structural damage, glass breakage, fatalities and injury are used to prioritize the heat 
exchangers in the heat exchanger network. Besides that, in order to define possible 
options of Inherently Safer Design (ISD) for HEN, various inherent safety principles 
can be considered. However, it is not recommended to implement all inherently safer 
design principles to one process system.  
 
Moreover, the selection of possible inherent safety principle that needs to be 
implemented depends upon the process system design and required outcome. There 
might be a trade-off among inherently safer design level and magnitude of heat 
recovery required for a specific heat exchanger. The inherent safety principles such 
as intensification, substitution, attenuation, simplification and limitation effect can be 
implemented at preliminary design stage. For this study, attenuation is applied which 
means reduction of the volumes of hazardous materials required in the process or 
reduction of operation hazards by changing the processing conditions to lower 











 3.2 Integrated Risk Estimation Tool 
 
      3.2.1 User Input and Process Simulation Data 
 
Users are required to key in a number of inputs in order to estimate consequences 
resulting from explosions by using integrated Risk Estimation Tool. In order to 
estimate the explosion risk and consequence, the mass released in an incident is 
extremely important. Mass released is a function of hole diameter, leak duration and 
pressure. Data such as hole diameter, atmospheric pressure and maximum distance of 
interest are required from users. Other process data such as composition, pressure, 
mass flow rates and heating value that are required by explosion calculation can be 
transferred from HYSYS to MS Excel (Azmi, M. S., et al, 2006).  
 
TABLE 3     Nomenclature & Subscripts  
Nomenclature Subscripts 
Ah  : Opening area (m²) amb                    : ambient 
CD  : Discharge coefficient ex                       : explosion 
HC                   : Heat of combustion (kJ/kg) mix                     : mixture 
HCTNT                  : Heat of combustion of TNT (4680 kJ/kg) f                          : flammable 
LFL                 : Lower flammability limit i                          : component i 
m                     : Total mass (kg) m                        : mechanical 
p                      : Pressure (kPa) x                         : component x 
Povr                         : Peak overpressure (kPa) y                         : component y 
Pr                    : Probit unit c                         : critical 
P                     : Probability o                         : system 
r                      : Actual distance (m)  
UFL                : Upper flammability limit  
y                      : Mole fraction of component in mixture  
z                      : Scaled distance (m/kg¹/³)  
ɳ                        : Efficiency factor  
ᵧ                      : Ratio of specific heat capacities, Cp/Cv  
ᵨ                      : Density (kg/m³)  
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       3.2.2 Estimation of Flammability Properties 
 
The basis to determine the Upper Flammability Limit (UFL) and the Lower 
Flammability Limit (LFL) is the data on stream compositions. Equations (1) and (2) 






      3.2.3 Estimation of Flammable Mass 
 
In order to determine whether the flow is choked or non-choked flow, Equation (3) 
uses operating pressure from the process stream in conjunction with ambient 
pressure. When the ratio of downstream to upstream pressure is in range of 0.5–0.9 
(CEPPO, 1999), it is considered choked flow. Flow rate is insensitive to pressure 
variation downstream of the choked point under the choked flow conditions. 
Discharge rates depend on the pressure upstream of the choked point and choking 
















According to (Woodward, J.L., 1999), the discharge coefficient, CD in Equation (4) 
is almost close to 0.975 for gases and vapour. CD increases from 0.61 to 0.975 as 
vapour fraction increases from 0 to 1 for two-phase flows and CD for liquids 
discharging from smooth orifice is around 0.61. Equation (5) is used to calculate the 




Explosion is not possible if initial Co is greater than CUFL as the mixture would be 
out of the flammability limits. However, it is assumed that Co will reduce and fall 
within flammability limits, thus allowing a possible explosive condition. The value 
of CLFL should be lower than CO for the calculations to be valid. In practice, the 
calculations of release rates cannot be carried out at great precision as neither the 
prevailing physical conditions nor the failure location are accurately defined. 
Therefore, it is acceptable that some simplifying assumptions are made allowing the 





       3.2.4 Estimation of Explosion Parameters 
 
Equation (6) is used to calculate the energy released from explosion which is 
determined by the TNT equivalent method: 
 
mTNT = ɳexmHC 
 
 
Scale distance, a parameter to determine the explosion overpressure was calculated 
by using Equation (7): 
 
z  =         r 
 
 
Equation (8) is used to calculate the overpressure: 
 
 
















 Whereby a, b and c are constants and their values are as follows: 
 





c1 - 1.6960 
c2 - 0.1542 
c3 +0.5141 
c4 +0.0988 
c5 - 0.2939 
c6 - 0.0268 
c7 + 0.1091 
c8 + 0.0016 
c9 - 0.0215 
c10 + 0.0001 




      3.2.5 Estimation of Potential Damages 
 
The corresponding damages illustrated in Figure 4 are based on the observation by 
(Clancey, V., 1972) and are used to predict the potential damages and injuries for 









FIGURE 4     Explosion effects and damage (Clancey, V., 1972) 
 
Probit equations are used to calculate the effects of explosions on humans in order to 
estimate the probability of damage and injuries as a function of overpressure 
determined in the TNT equivalent method. These equations are derived from 
experimental studies and actual observations based on (The Netherlands 
Organization of Applied Scientific Research, 1989).  
 
Probit equation relating structural damage to overpressure: 
 







 Probit equation relating glass breakage to overpressure: 
 
Pr = -18.1 + 2.79 ln povr 
 
Probit equation relating fertility to overpressure: 
 
Pr = -77.1 + 6.91 ln povr 
 
Probit equation relating injury to overpressure: 
 
Pr = -15.6 + 1.93 ln povr 
 
 














 3.3 Gantt Chart & Key Milestones 
 
TABLE 5     Gantt Chart & Key Milestone for FYP 1 
No. Detail/Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Selection of 
Project Topic 




              
3. Submission of 
Extended 
Proposal 
              
4. Proposal 
Defence 
              
5. Project Work 
Continues 
              
6. Submission of 
Interim Draft 
Report 
              
7. Submission of 
Interim Report 
              
 








 TABLE 6     Gantt Chart & Key Milestone for FYP 2 
No. Detail/Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Project Work 
Continues 
               
2. Submission of 
Progress 
Report 
               
3. Project Work 
Continues 
               
4. Pre – EDX                
5. Submission of 
Draft Report 
               
6. Submission of 
Dissertation 
(Soft Bound) 
               
7. Submission of 
Technical 
Paper 
               
8. Oral 
Presentation 
               




               
            







CHAPTER 4   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Two case studies were carried out to partly demonstrate the application of the 
proposed framework by the implementation of iRET tool to determine the failure 
potential of shell and tube heat exchanger at preliminary design stage. Case studies 1 
and 2 demonstrated the capabilities of iRET tool to assess the failure potential of heat 
exchangers in a steam reforming plant as well as in a methanol plant. Results of case 
studies 1 and 2 are provided in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 respectively. 
 
4.1 Case Study 1: Steam Reforming Plant 
 
      4.1.1 Steam Reforming Plant before Applying Inherent Safety Principles  
 
The functionality of iRET tool can be demonstrated by conducting a case study on 
the failure potential of heat exchangers in a steam reforming plant. Figure 5 







FIGURE 5     Case Study 1 – HYSYS Simulation of Steam Reforming Plant before Applying Inherent Safety Principles 
       26
 In case study 1, the heat exchanger with the highest failure potential was investigated 
from a total of four shell and tube heat exchangers. The loss of containment was 
assumed to be a small leak which originated from 0.0124 meter diameter holes on the 
heat exchangers. During the initial period, these leaks displayed choked flow 
conditions due to high pressure in the heat exchangers. Due to the limitation of 
HYSYS steady-state version, the transition from choked flow to non-choked flow 
was not considered in this project. 
 
The initial release rate, m was kept constant at 50,000 kg/s. The selected streams 
resulted in different flammability limits (CLFL and CUFL) as well as flammable mass 
fraction (mf/m) due to different compositions. Comparisons were made for the 
possible destructions observed from a hypothetical explosion from each of the 
streams. TNO correlation method was used to estimate the consequence from 
explosion and the results are tabulated in Table 7. The results indicated that any 
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 The iRET tool prediction of potential structural damage, glass breakage, fatalities 
and injuries to humans are shown in Table 7. These results were obtained by using 
the probit functions, based the overpressure calculated by the TNT equivalent 
method. Table 7 shows that the probability of fatalities is zero at a distance of 100m 
from the centre of explosion for all streams. However, the probabilities of structural 
damage, glass breakage and injury are high and need to be reduced. The probabilities 
of consequence impacts are affected by the heat of combustion whereby the higher 
the heat of combustion, the higher the probabilities of consequence impacts.  
 
Heat exchanger E-100 has the highest heat of combustion with a value of 49,598.96 
kJ/kg compared to other heat exchangers as shown in Table 7. Moreover, this heat 
exchanger has the highest probability of injury as well at 0.09 due to its high heat of 
combustion. Hence, the first heat exchanger could be considered as the most critical 
heat exchanger in this analysis. By adopting inherent safety principles, the process 
conditions can be modified to achieve a safer design at preliminary design stage and 
lower the risk and consequence levels of the first heat exchanger which has the 
highest failure potential.  
 
 
      4.1.2 Steam Reforming Plant after Applying Inherent Safety Principles 
 
The modified HYSYS simulation and results after applying inherent safety principles 







FIGURE 6     Case Study 1 – Modified HYSYS Simulation of Steam Reforming Plant after Applying Inherent Safety Principles 
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 TABLE 8     Modified Calculations on the Probabilities of Consequence Impacts as a Function of Overpressure in the TNT Equivalent Method 












































































































































 The modification of HYSYS simulation of the steam reforming plant is done by 
adopting inherent safety principle known as attenuation whereby the mixer (MIX-
102) is relocated to the front of the first heat exchanger as illustrated in Figure 6. 
This modification was necessary in order to reduce the heat of combustion and 
subsequently reduce the probability of injury. As shown in Table 8, the heat of 
combustion has reduced by 71% from 49598.46 kJ/kg to 14376.89 kJ/kg and this 
reduction has managed to reduce the probability of injury from 0.09 to 0.04. 
Therefore, this case study has successfully demonstrated the potential application of 
iRET tool in process design to estimate the failure potential of heat exchanger 



















 4.2 Case Study 2: Methanol Plant 
 
      4.2.1 Methanol Plant before Applying Inherent Safety Principles  
 
The functionality of iRET tool was demonstrated by conducting another case study 
on the failure potential of heat exchangers in a methanol plant. HYSY simulation of a 
methanol plant is illustrated in Figure 7. In case study 2, the heat exchanger with the 
highest failure potential was investigated from a total of six shell and tube heat 
exchangers. The loss of containment in this case study was assumed to be a small 
leak which originated from 0.0124 meter diameter holes on the heat exchangers. 
During the initial period, these leaks displayed choked flow conditions due to high 
pressure in the heat exchangers. Due to the limitation of HYSYS steady-state 

















FIGURE 7     Case Study 2 – HYSYS Simulation of Methanol Plant before Applying Inherent Safety Principles 
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 The initial release rate, m was kept constant at 50,000 kg/s. The selected streams 
resulted in different flammability limits (CLFL and CUFL) as well as flammable mass 
fraction (mf/m) due to different compositions. Comparisons were made for the 
possible destructions observed from a hypothetical explosion from each of the 
streams. TNO correlation method was used to estimate the consequence from 
explosion and the results are tabulated in Table 9. The results indicated that any 




















































































































































































































 The iRET tool prediction of potential structural damage, glass breakage, fatalities 
and injuries to humans are shown in Table 9. These results were obtained by using 
the probit functions, based on the overpressure calculated by the TNT equivalent 
method. Table 9 shows that the probability of fatalities is zero at a distance of 100m 
from the centre of explosion for all streams. However, the probabilities of structural 
damage, glass breakage and injury are high and need to be reduced. The probabilities 
of consequence impacts are affected by the heat of combustion whereby the higher 
the heat of combustion, the higher the probabilities of consequence impacts. 
 
Heat exchangers E-100, E-101 and E-102 have the highest heat of combustion with a 
value of 45,272.63 kJ/kg compared to other heat exchangers as shown in Table 9. 
Moreover, these heat exchangers have the highest probability of injury as well at 
0.07 due to its high heat of combustion. As there are three heat exchangers with the 
same heat of combustion, hence, the heat exchanger with the highest log mean 
temperature difference was taken as the most critical heat exchanger. The log mean 
temperature difference was 187.9 ⁰C, 146.6 ⁰C and 40.88 ⁰C for heat exchangers E-
100, E-101 and E-102 respectively.  
 
Therefore, the first heat exchanger or E-100 could be considered as the most critical 
heat exchanger in this analysis. By adopting inherent safety principles, the process 
conditions can be modified to achieve a safer design at preliminary design stage and 
lower the risk and consequence levels of the first heat exchanger which has the 







            4.2.2 Methanol Plant after Applying Inherent Safety Principles  
 
The modified HYSYS simulation and results after applying inherent safety principles are shown in Figure 8 and Table 10 respectively: 
 
FIGURE 8     Case Study 2 – Modified HYSYS Simulation of Methanol Plant after Applying Inherent Safety Principles 
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 TABLE 10     Modified Calculations on the Probabilities of Consequence Impacts as a Function of Overpressure in the TNT Equivalent Method 























































































































































































 The modification of HYSYS simulation of the methanol plant is done by adopting 
inherent safety principle known as attenuation whereby another mixer (MIX-101) is 
added with a feed of nitrogen to the front of the first heat exchanger as illustrated in 
Figure 8. This modification was necessary in order to reduce the heat of combustion 
and subsequently reduce the probability of injury. As shown in Table 10, the heat of 
combustion has reduced by 78.8% from 45272.63 kJ/kg to 9585.69 kJ/kg and this 
reduction has managed to reduce the probability of injury from 0.07 to 0.03. 
 
Therefore, this case study has successfully demonstrated the potential application of 
iRET tool in process design to estimate the failure potential of heat exchanger 
network at preliminary design stages. Hence, design engineers can compare the 
potential damages to acceptable criteria by the implementation of integrated Risk 
Estimation Tool. If estimated risk does not meet the requirements, process conditions 
can be modified instantaneously by adopting inherent safety principles to achieve 

















CHAPTER 5   
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
A prototype iRET tool based on the framework in Figures 3 and 4 was used to study 
the failure potential assessment of heat exchanger network (HEN) at the preliminary 
design stage. The risk and consequence estimation for worst explosion scenario can 
easily be done in the initial process design stage with iRET tool. Initially, iRET was 
limited for piping systems only. Through this study, it has enhanced the scope of 
iRET for Heat Exchanger Network. Heat exchanger possesses high heat of 
combustion or heating value of process fluid which results in high consequence 
impacts. Hence, further development of iRET tool was done and it provided the 
opportunity of inherently safer design of heat exchanger network by the application 
of inherent safety principles and produced a comprehensive inherent safety tool for 
process plant design. Finally, one of the recommendations is iRET tool has a 
potential to commercialize due to its easy understandable approach and widespread 
application in process industry. Besides that, the same methodology can be used to 
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HEAT EXCHANGER FAILURES CASE STUDIES/FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORTS. 
Exchanger Basic cause of Incident 
Incident Report/Publication Name and year 
 




    
 
To preheat Feed High Temperature Heavy fire Catastrophic rupture of heat exchanger Investigation 
 
gas to Reactor by    Hydrogen Attack. included seven report of Tesoro Anacortes refinery issued by U.S. 
 
using outlet gas of  Fatalities. Chemical safety and hazard investigation board May 
 
same reactor.   2014. 
      
Industrial water at Impingement attack 
9 tubes were  
 
leaked out of Erosion-corrosion of heat exchanger tubes “B.Kuznicka”  
shell side and lead towards Erosion 
 
118 and unit was shut 
down. 
Engineering failure analysis 16 (2009) 2382-2387. 
 
coolant at tube side. corrosion 
 
   
 
 Low velocity led  Effect of flow induced corrosion and erosion on failure of 
 
Cooling water on towards fouling and  tubular heat exchanger “Khalil Ranjbar” Material and 
 
tube side and steam flow induced erosion. Not Mentioned design 31 (2010) 613-619. 
 
is on shell side. Inappropriate tubes   
 
 material.   
 
Flue gas at shell Poor water treatment  Failure analysis of ammonia plant heat exchanger 101-C 
 
side and Boiler leads towards creep Not Mentioned “Jahromi, AliPour and Beirami” Engineering failure 
 
Feed Water (BFW) attack due to  analysis 10 (2003) 405-421. 
 
at tube side. overheating of tubes.   
 
Flue gases outside Thermal cycling  Failure analysis of a heat-exchanger serpentine “  Azevedo 
 
and thermal fluid leads towards thermal  and Alves”  Engineering Failure Analysis 12 (2005) 193– 
 
inside of tubes of fatigue (corrosion Not Mentioned 200 
 
vertical heat fatigue).   
 
exchanger    
 
Four gas coolers,  Unit was shut Failure analysis of heat exchanger tubes of four gas 
 
gas is inside of tube Crevice corrosion down after 01 coolers “ Allahkaram, Zakersafaee and  Haghgoo” 
 
and seawater is on  year. Engineering Failure Analysis 18 (2011) 1108–1114 
 
shell side.    
 
Cooling water Galvanic corrosion  Failure analysis of a shell and tube oil cooler “ Mousavian 
 
flows inside of tube and incompatible Not Mentioned ,  Hajjari et al “ Engineering Failure Analysis 18 (2011) 
 
and hot oil flows on material of gaskets.  202–211 
 
shell side.    
 
Process gas and Pitting attack due to  Failure of a HE in Sulfur Recovery Unit of a petroleum 
 
boiler feed water in excess H2S and SO2 Not Mentioned refinery “V.F.C. Linsa,, E.M. Guimara˜”  Journal of Loss 
 
boiler. in system  Prevention in the Process Industries 20 (2007) 91–97 
 
    
 
Process gas at shell Cycling heating and  Failure analysis of heat exchanger tubes “ Usman,Nasir 
 
and Boiler feed cooling caused Not Mentioned A.Khan” Engineering Failure Analysis 15 (2008) 118–128 
 
water at tube side thermal fatigue   
 
    
 
Ammonia heat Over pressurization One person Heat exchanger rupture and ammonia release in Houston, 
 
exchanger  killed and six Texasissued by U.S. Chemical safety and hazard 
 
  injured. investigation board June 2008. 
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